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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY1 
Lithium‟s potential as a key ingredient in the new generation 
of electric car batteries has raised international interest. It is 
the lightest metal on the planet and used in most electronic 
equipments and advance batteries. Lithium is also used in 
ceramics and glass production, bi-polar medication, air 
conditioners, lubricants, nuclear weaponry, and other 
products. 
 
The world‟s largest lithium mining company predicted that 
in the near future 10 percent of all new cars - close to 5 
million vehicles per year - would be powered by lithium-ion 
batteries. It also predicted that this rate would rise to 20 
percent by 2020.  Given existing, known supplies, this means 
that the world could run out of lithium, a non-renewable 
resource, in 2020.  
 
Powerful multinational corporations plan to invest billions in 
future lithium production. Some industry predictions 
estimate that lithium car battery sales could jump ten-fold 
from $100 million to $103 billion per year over the next two 
decades. If such investments take place, countries that 
possess lithium, like Bolivia, and are willing to export it 
could become important suppliers in the global economy.  
 
The largest lithium reserve bases are found in Argentina, 
Bolivia and Chile.  Bolivia‟s lithium reserves are estimated 
at between 5.5 and 8.9 million tons and ranked among the 
largest in the world. They are found in the beautiful Salar de 
Uyuni (Uyuni Saltpan), a 3,860 square mile high-desert 
(Altiplano) area of salt-embedded minerals in the Bolivian 
Andes located in the country‟s southwestern Potosí 
Department, bordering Chile‟s Atacama Dessert. 
                                                 
1 The authors wish to thank Dr. Michael Muthig, Technology Transfer 
Specialist at CTC, and Dr. Alfredo Ravinet of FIU‟s Applied Research 
Center and College of Engineering, for careful reading of the manuscript 
and thoughtful comments. 
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The concentration of lithium varies widely in different parts 
of the Salar de Uyuni.  Production may focus on small areas.  
Much of the lithium could remain inaccessible or would take 
decades to extract.  Considering the real grade and 
distribution of lithium in the Uyuni, the deposits may not be 
a particularly attractive resource and the real exploitable 
reserve could be only approximately 300,000 tons rather than 
the estimated millions.  In 2009, a pilot operation was 
initiated in the Salar de Uyuni to determine the technical and 
economic feasibility of mining and refining the lithium-rich 
brine. Results from this effort should provide significant 
insights into the potential value of Bolivian lithium deposits.  
 
Bolivia will have to invest heavily over the next few years in 
order to produce lithium carbonate for export.  It is virtually 
inevitable that Bolivia will have to seek partnerships with 
foreign companies in 2010 and beyond to obtain badly 
needed capital and technology. It remains to be seen if the 
current administration of President Evo Morales (2006-
present) will be able to take advantage of growing market 
demands for lithium or the opportunity will be left for future 
Bolivian governments. 
 
President Morales is attempting to change the past patterns 
of foreign exploitation by asserting national control of 
Bolivia‟s huge natural gas reserves and its massive lithium 
deposits. To date, his government has maintained strict state 
control of the country‟s lithium resources and limited foreign 
access and investment. Also, several of Bolivia‟s indigenous 
organizations, active in the Salar de Uyuni region, have 
demanded a “fair” share in the eventual bounty to be reaped 
from future lithium exploitation.   As a result, mining of 
Bolivian lithium reserves will depend for now on the 
capacity of the Morales administration to negotiate and 
balance the benefits of all the stakeholders vs. his own 
political agenda.  
 
3 
Since 2006, foreign corporations and governments have 
lobbied the Bolivian government for access to the lithium 
riches.  Among them, Japanese automakers, Brazil, Canada, 
French electric car maker, Bolloré, and others.  In 2009, 
COMIBOL signed a Memorandum of Understanding with 
Korean Resources Corporation and with the French Bolloré 
Group.  Also in 2009, during the visit of Iran‟s President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to La Paz, an agreement reached 
committed Iran to assist Bolivia on conducting lithium 
research. Iranian experts will join Brazil's Ministry of 
Science and researchers from companies such as France's 
Eramet SA and Bolloré SA, to hold a joint study on the 
lithium reserves. Bolivia‟s current tensions with Washington 
have effectively left American companies on the sidelines as 
other foreign enterprises continue to actively negotiate 
lithium deals in Bolivia.   
 
Serious potential environmental problems stemming from 
lithium mining in Bolivia cannot be ignored. The 
ecologically fragile Salar de Uyuni could become an 
environmental disaster, if sufficient precautions are not 
taken. Also, lithium development could seriously damage 
two key industries in the region – agriculture and tourism.  
The Salar de Uyuni, the brightest spot on earth as seen from 
space is an area of outstanding natural beauty.    More than 
60,000 tourists visit the area every year.  The ecosystem as 
well as the tourist industry in the area could be seriously 
compromised in the search for lithium.   
 
Finally, the chronic institutional deficiencies and lack of 
stability of the Bolivian state pose serious questions 
regarding its capacity to manage an ambitious lithium 
development program. Problems of inadequate 
administrative capacity within the Bolivian government 
clearly antedate the current Morales administration 
 
  
4 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As the world seeks energy alternatives and the efficient ways 
to use and store it, Bolivia has been thrown into the limelight 
as the country with the largest estimated lithium reserve 
base.    Lithium is the lightest metal and coveted in the 
production of electric cars batteries and electronic 
equipment. Foreign corporations and governments alike have 
been lobbying the Bolivian government for access to its 
lithium riches. Yet, Bolivia faces daunting challenges in 
developing the lithium from its huge reserve base. The most 
significant of these challenges are as follows: 
 
1. Need to invest heavily over the next few years to 
produce lithium for export. 
2. Lack of technical and managerial capabilities to 
develop the lithium on its own.  
3. A pattern of nationalization of natural resources 
which scares away investors with the required 
know how and capacity to develop the lithium. 
4. The Morales government hesitation in choosing 
partners. 
5. Geological assessment of the grade and 
distribution of lithium that indicate that the 
concentration of lithium varies widely and 
production would concentrate in small areas.  
Most of the lithium could remain inaccessible, 
not be economical, or would take decades to 
extract.  
6. The risks of environmental damage to the Salar 
de Uyuni ecosystem and to surrounding 
communities could surpass benefits of lithium 
extraction. 
 
Largely because of internal political tensions and 
nationalism, Bolivia continues in 2010 to vacillate regarding 
how best to tap its lithium reserves.  This delay has permitted 
5 
nations with smaller reserves, like Chile and China, to step 
up to meet growing world demands for lithium.  Yet, 
geologists and economists are unsure whether world lithium 
reserves outside of Bolivia are enough to meet exploding 
global demand, although some are convinced that accessible 
lithium resources are significantly larger than estimated by 
the United States Geological Survey.  If true, Bolivia‟s 
current window of opportunity to exploit its lithium could 
eventually be eclipsed by lithium finds in other regions or by 
the emergence of new, alternative technological 
breakthroughs that do not rely on lithium at all.  As Bolivian 
economist Juan Carlos Zuleta claims: "We have the most 
magnificent lithium reserves on the planet, but if we don't 
step into the race now, we will lose this chance. The market 
will find other solutions."
2
 
 
This paper looks at the uses of lithium, the geological 
assessments that have been made of the Bolivian lithium 
reserves and the implications for both Bolivia and for the 
United States in terms of the decisions that Bolivia will make 
on how best to exploit its potential richness.  It also offers 
some conclusions and recommendations in the context of US 
security interests.  An appendix provides a brief synopsis of 
the Morales government.   
  
THE DEMAND FOR LITHIUM  
 
Lithium‟s use as a key ingredient in the new generation of 
electric car batteries has raised international interest. It is the 
lightest metal on the planet and used in most electronic 
equipments and advance batteries.  As of 2007, 60 percent of 
the world‟s cell phones and some 90 percent of laptops 
contained lithium batteries and the percentages continue to 
                                                 
2 Jason Mick, “Tensions Soar Among Industrialized Nations Over 
Bolivia‟s Lithium Supplies,” Daily Tech, Feb. 6, 2009, 
http://www.dailytech.com/Tensions+Soar+Among+Industrial+Nations+
Over+Bolivias+Lithium+Supply/ article14173.htm.  
6 
rise each year. Lithium is also used in ceramics and glass 
production, bi-polar medication, air conditioners, lubricants, 
nuclear weaponry, and other products.
3
 
 
Powerful multinational corporations plan to invest billions in 
future lithium production. Some industry predictions 
estimate that lithium car battery sales could jump ten-fold 
from $100 million to $103 billion per year over the next two 
decades. If such investments take place, countries that 
possess lithium, like Bolivia, and are willing to export it 
could become important suppliers in the global economy.
4
 
 
Despite the enthusiasm, there are also concerns about lithium 
batteries on both the economic, technical, and environmental 
fronts. The process for transforming lithium into its 
commercially valuable form, lithium carbonate, remains 
complex and expensive. The electrical vehicle batteries 
currently being developed with lithium are still too large and 
heavy and charge too slowly. The batteries are so expensive 
that they push the cost of electricity-driven cars beyond the 
reach of most consumers, although lithium accounts for less 
                                                 
3
 Lithium use worldwide by volume in 2007 broke down as follows: 
Polymer 4%; Chemical Process 3%; Battery 25%; Air-conditioning 6%; 
Lubricant 12%; Glass 8%; Ceramics 10%; Aluminum 4%; Continuous 
Casting 3%; Pharmaceutical 3%; Others 22%, in Brian W. Jaskula, 
“Lithium,” Washington DC:  US Geological Survey (USGS), 2007.  
4Rory Carroll and Andres Schipani, “Multinationals eye lithium reserves 
beneath Bolivia‟s salt flats,” The Guardian, June 17, 2009; Stephen 
Markley, “Will Lithium-Air Battery Be the Silver Bullet?” The Miami 
Herald, May 07, 2010. Demand for lithium has skyrocketed over the last 
five years as manufacturers of batteries for BlackBerrys, iPods and other 
electronic devices have increasingly relied on the mineral. It is, however, 
the automobile industry that looms as the largest potential consumer of 
lithium over the next decade and beyond, because lithium batteries would 
allow electric cars to store more energy and be driven longer distances 
than the heavier nickel batteries.  
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than five percent of the estimated cost of battery today.
5
 
Lithium batteries also have a record of catching fire. So 
while lithium car batteries might become a massive global 
market in the future, they could also fizzle.
6
   
 
Environmental studies claim that mass production of lithium 
carbonate is not environmentally sound.  The Meridian 
International Research, for example, has concluded that, “it 
could cause irreparable ecological damage to ecosystems that 
should be protected and that Lilon propulsion is 
incompatible with the notion of the “Green Car.”7 
 
Yet, in 2007, SQM, the world‟s largest lithium mining 
company predicted that in the near future 10 percent of all 
new cars - close to 5 million vehicles per year - would be 
powered by lithium-ion batteries. It also predicted that this 
rate would rise to 20 percent by 2020. Based on such 
predictions, the demand for battery-grade lithium carbonate 
would rise from 85,000 tons per year in 2007 to 160,000 tons 
per year in 2015. Given existing, known supplies, this means 
that the world would run out of lithium, a non-renewable 
resource, in 2020. In that context, some experts belief that 
depletion rates of lithium could exceed current oil depletion 
rates and switch dependency from one diminishing resources 
to another.
8
  These forecasts, however, depend on unreliable 
forecasts of increasing production of electric vehicles and do 
                                                 
5
 Interview with Jay Chmelauskas, President, Western Lithium Canada 
Corporation, in Jon Knox, “All Set to Power New Generation Lithium 
Batteries,” Automotive Industries, March 22, 2009. 
6
 Simon Romero, “In Bolivia, Untapped Bounty Meets Nationalism,” The 
New York Times, February 3, 2009; Christine Negroni, “Lithium Battery 
Risks Draw Scrutiny,” The New York Times, October 27, 2009, Saqib 
Rhaim, “Will Lithium-Air Battery Rescue Electric Car Drivers from 
'Range Anxiety‟?” The New York Times, May 7, 2010. 
7
 Meridian International Research, “The Trouble with Lithium 2:  Under 
the Microscope,” Le Legers, France, 29 May 2008, pp.1. 
8
 William Tahil, “The Trouble with Lithium,” Meridian International 
Research, December 2006, pp. 1. 
8 
not take into consideration technological changes that would 
affect content of lithium in batteries and suspected lithium 
reserves in un-surveyed regions, such as Africa.   At the 
moment, lithium seems to be abundant and inexpensive.
9
   
 
The United States is the main importer of lithium materials 
and compounds and the leading producer of value-added 
lithium materials.   In 2009, the US Department of Energy 
funded US$2.4 billion in grants to accelerate the 
development of US manufacturing capacity for batteries and 
electric-drive components and for the deployment of electric-
drive vehicles. The grants are designed to launch an 
advanced battery industry in the United States.
10
 
 
LITHIUM RESERVES AND PRODUCTION 
 
Lithium reserves are contained in five raw natural mineral 
forms:  Continental Brines, Pragmatites, Hetolites, Oil Filed 
Brines and Geothermal Brines, having the first one the 
richest contain of lithium.  Experts disagree on availability of 
lithium reserves.  The US Geological Survey, for example, 
indicates that lithium resources total 2.5 million tons in the 
United States and approximately 23 million tons in other 
countries, mainly Bolivia, Chile, Argentina and China.
11
 It 
also predicts that that there are still huge supplies of lithium 
that remain untapped world-wide.
12
   
 
                                                 
9
 Toby Procter, “How long will Lithium last?” BLOG, 20 April 2009, 
http://www.climatechangecorp./content.asp.  
10
 Brian W. Jaskula, “Lithium,” in U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral 
Commodity Summaries, January 2010, pp.92-93. 
11
 Ibid. pp. 93. 
12
 Jaskula, “Mineral Commodities Summaries,” Washington DC: U.S. 
Geological Survey, January 2009; and Keith Johnson, “Peak Lithium: 
Will Supply Fears Drive Alternative Batteries?” Environmental Capital, 
February 3, 2009.   
9 
The largest lithium reserve bases are found in Argentina, 
Bolivia and Chile.
13
 Nearly 80 percent of the known global 
lithium reserve base is located in the “The Lithium 
Triangle,” an area bordered by the three large South 
American salt flats:  The Salar de Atacama in Chile, the 
Salar de Uyuni in Bolivia, and the Salar del Hombre Muerto 
in Argentina.   In 2005-2008, the United States imported 63 
percent of its lithium needs from Chile.
14
  
 
The largest known lithium reserves in North America are 
found in the near surface lithium clay deposit located in the 
State of Nevada.  This is the main domestic supplier for the 
United States.  The deposits are being mined by Canada‟s 
Western Lithium Corporation.  An estimated 11 million 
tones of lithium carbonate equivalent are located within five 
mineralized near surface zones.  Just one of the five zones 
could produce 20,000 tons a year, or approximately one-fifth 
of the world production.
15
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 The Reserve Base is the part of the identified resource that meets 
specified minimum physical and chemical criteria related to current 
mining and production practices.  It is a rather nebulous figure. Only 
“reserves” should be considered available at the moment, of which 
Bolivia is yet to be determined, in Tahil, opp cit. “The Trouble with 
Lithium,” pp. 4. 
14
 Jaskula, opp. cit. 
15
 Interview with Jay Chmelauskas, President, Western Lithium Canada 
Corporation, opp. cit.  
10 
Global Lithium Production and Reserves 
Country Production 2008  
Meter Tons 
Reserves
16
 
Chile 10,600 7,500,000 
Australia 6,280 580,000 
China 3,290 540,000 
Argentina 3,170 800,000 
United States 1,000 38,000 
Canada 690 180,000 
Portugal 700 -- 
Zimbabwe 500 23,000 
Brazil 160 190,000 
Bolivia -- - 
Source: US Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 
2010 
   
Chile is the world‟s largest producer and exporter of lithium 
carbonate.  Chilean lithium is being mined by Chemetall, a 
subsidiary of the New Jersey-based Rockwood Holdings 
Inc., and Soquimich (SQM), a Chilean state-owned 
company. Together they produce seventy percent of all 
lithium carbonate from Chile‟s lucrative Salar de Atacama. 
With an output of 40,000 metric tons of lithium carbonate 
per year, Chile currently supplies a third of the global 
market. Estimates of Chile‟s remaining lithium reserves 
range from 3 million to 7.5 million tons. Chile‟s lithium 
reserves are also among the purest in the world and Chile‟s 
easy access to sea transport helps keep its total production 
costs low.
17
 
 
Australia, China, Argentina and the United States follow 
Chile as the largest producers of lithium. Serbia and Finland 
also produce lithium. Large deposits exist in several other 
                                                 
16
 The US Geological Survey discontinued reserve base estimates in 
2009. 
17
 Sean Goforth, “Argentina, Bolivia and Chile: The ABCs of Lithium,” 
World Politics Review, 01 Apr 2010.  
11 
countries but production is low due to the high cost of 
extraction. These limitations mean that the future of the 
world‟s lithium supplies remains uncertain and may be 
insufficient to meet potential future demand.  
 
BOLIVIA’S LITHIUM  
 
With governments around the globe (including the United 
States) demanding increased fuel efficiency to reduce their 
dependence on imported oil, private foreign corporations are 
keenly pursuing access to Bolivia‟s lithium. Bolivia‟s 
lithium reserves are estimated at 5.5 million tons.
18
  Some 
analysts believe that the reserves could be as high as 8.9 
million tons, the largest in the world.  The reserve base is 
found principally in the Salar de Uyuni (Uyuni Saltpan), a 
3,860 square mile high-desert (Altiplano) area of salt-
embedded minerals in the Bolivian Andes located in the 
country‟s southwestern Potosí Department, bordering Chile‟s 
Atacama Dessert.
19
 The beautiful Salar de Uyuni is the 
largest salt flat in the world and the brightest object on the 
Earth‟s surface visible from space. Many experts believe that 
efficient exploitation of Bolivia‟s lithium deposits could 
substantially increase present world supplies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18
  Jaskula, “Lithium.” 
19
 Juan Carlos Zuleta, “El enorme potencial de litio de Bolivia,” La Paz, 
Bolivia: Hora 25, No. 69, Nov. 18-Dec.2, 2009. 
12 
Map of Bolivia 
 
 
There is no definite data on Bolivia‟s lithium reserves.  TRU 
Group, a lithium consulting firm, indicates that harvesting 
and processing lithium from the large Salar de Uyuni is a 
difficult and tricky task.  TRU argues that further strategic 
deep drilling exploration is required before the real potential 
of Bolivia‟s to produce lithium carbonate for batteries is 
determined.
20
 
 
The French Meridian Research group also believes that 
estimates of the concentration of lithium vary widely in 
different parts of the Salar.  Production would concentrate in 
                                                 
20
 TRU Group Inc., “Development of the World‟s Largest Lithium 
Brine,” Uyuni Lithium Brine Salar Resource Bolivia Development, 
http://trugroup.com/Uyuni-lithium.html. 
13 
small areas.  Most of the lithium could remain inaccessible 
or would take decades to extract.
21
  The Meridian Research 
Reports that:   
 
The structure of the Salar de Uyuni is very 
different to the Salar de Atacama 
(Chile)….Whereas the brine containing halite 
layer in the Salar de Atacama is 35 meters 
thick, the Uyuni halite deposit is very 
thin…The halite is…porous all the way 
through, with a much higher porosity of 35% 
and is filled with interstitial brine.  This 
means that the quality of lithium available per 
unit surface is much lower and a 
correspondingly greater area of the Salar will 
have to be exploited for an equivalent lithium 
production.
22
 
 
The report concludes that, considering the real grade and 
distribution of lithium in the Uyuni, its lithium might not be 
a particularly attractive resource and that the real exploitable 
reserve could be only approximately 300,000 tons rather than 
the estimated millions.  Also, the available methods for 
mining could be highly environmentally damaging.
23
  
 
The current Bolivian government of President Evo Morales 
(2006-present) has put forward a general plan for the 
development of its lithium deposits, but the specific details 
of how Bolivia‟s lithium will be mined, by whom and under 
what terms have not yet been clarified. In March 2008, the 
Morales government issued a decree investing $5.7 million 
to set up a state owned “pilot extraction plant” at the edge of 
the Salar de Uyuni.  The plant is operated by a “General 
Directorate of Evaporative Resources of the Salar de Uyuni,” 
                                                 
21
 Meridian International Research, “The Trouble with Lithium 2,” pp.13. 
22
 Ibid, pp. 13. 
23
 Ibid, pp. 14. 
14 
under the state mining company COMIBOL (Corporación 
Mineral de Bolivia).  Drilling started in August 2009.
24
 
 
The pilot plant is intended to determine the technical and 
economic feasibility of getting the lithium-rich brine out 
from under the Salar‟s crust and separating it into its distinct, 
marketable products. Building on the experience of this pilot 
plant, the Morales government intends to construct a much 
larger industrial-scale plant capable of producing up to 
30,000 to 40,000 metric tons of lithium carbonate per year. A 
third phase, in which marketable lithium compounds will be 
produced in association or partnership with foreign investors, 
will then follow.
25
 
 
The costs involved in making the Bolivian lithium industry 
operational will be very high.  Current estimates suggest that 
it could cost at least $200 million just to make the main plant 
operational. Substantial additional investments to support 
needed chemical industries and substantial infrastructure 
development in the Salar de Uyuni - still a remote and 
largely undeveloped region of the country - would also be 
required at a price of at least U.S. $1 billion or more. In light 
of both the costs and the technological problems involved, 
Bolivia is exploring partnerships with foreign investors, a 
strategy that some local community groups and many 
Bolivian nationalists do not support.
26
   
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 Ibid, pp. 14. 
25
 John M. Broder, “U.S. Issues Limits on Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
from Cars,” The New York Times, April 1, 2010;  and Rebecca Hollender 
and Jim Schultz, “Bolivia and its Lithium:  Can the „Gold of the 21st 
Century‟ Help Lift a Nation out of Poverty?” Cochabamba, Bolivia:  A 
Democracy Center Special Report, The Democracy Center, May 2010, 
pp. 24-25. 
26
 Ibid, pp. 34-36; and Romero, “In Bolivia, Untapped Bounty Meets 
Nationalism.” 
15 
CHOOSING A PARTNER 
 
Since 2006, foreign corporations and governments have 
lobbied the Bolivian government for access to the lithium 
riches. Bolivia has a long, often bitter history of foreign 
mining and mineral exports that stretches back to the 
exploitation of its legendary Potosí silver mines by the 
Spanish during the colonial era.  The administration of 
President Morales is attempting to change the past patterns 
of foreign exploitation by asserting national control of 
Bolivia‟s huge natural gas reserves and its massive lithium 
deposits.
27
 To date, the Morales government has maintained 
strict state control of the country‟s lithium resources and 
limited foreign access and investment. Also, several of 
Bolivia‟s indigenous organizations, active in the Salar de 
Uyuni region, have demanded a “fair” share in the eventual 
bounty to be reaped from future lithium exploitation.
28
    
 
Among the major international investors interested in 
Bolivia‟s lithium are Brazil, Iran, the Japanese companies 
Mitsubishi and Sumitomo, South Korea and the French 
electric vehicle manufacturer, Bolloré.
29
 In 2009, COMIBOL 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Korean 
                                                 
27
 Hollender and Schultz, “Bolivia and its Lithium,” pp. 3-4; and Barjak, 
Frank and Carlos Valdez, “Bolivia Pins Hopes on Lithium, Electric 
Vehicles,” Associated Press, February 28, 2009. 
28
 Romero, “In Bolivia, Untapped Bounty Meets Nationalism;” and 
Damian Kahya, “Bolivia holds key to electric car future,” BBC News, 9 
November 2009. 
29
 Carroll and Schpani, “Multinationals eye lithium reserves beneath 
Bolivia‟s salt flats.” Demand for lithium carbonate doubled from 2003 to 
2007, and the market for lithium-ion batteries may expand to 14 times its 
2009 size by 2030. In the shorter term, lithium‟s potential has led Credit 
Suisse to expect a 13% rise in sales of lithium-ion (Li-Ion) batteries and a 
10% rise in sales of liquid crystal displays (LCD) within a 3–4 year 
horizon due to growing demand for portable electronic instruments. 
Credit Suisse, “Investment Ideas Bright outlook for lithium-ion batteries 
and liquid crystal,” Research Flash, Zurich, 14 October 2009. 
16 
Resources Corporation.
30
 Also in 2009, during the visit of 
Iran‟s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to La Paz, an 
agreement reached committed Iran to assist Bolivia on 
conducting lithium research.   Iranian experts will join 
Brazil's Ministry of Science and researchers from companies 
such as France's Eramet SA and Bolloré SA, to hold a joint 
study on the lithium reserves.
31
 The agreement with Iran also 
calls for exchange of scientific and technical information, 
Iranian training of Bolivian professionals on the subject and 
promoting faculty exchanges.  The Iranian-Bolivian 
technical commission will also analyze potential for 
marketing lithium by-products in Iran and other countries.
32
 
During a previous visit to Bolivia, President Ahmadinejad 
also showed interest in Bolivia‟s uranium, although reserves 
are considered minimal. 
 
Since September 2009, the French electric car consortium, 
Bolloré-Eramet, has been pressing the Morales government 
for an agreement. They have satisfied demands placed by the 
Morales government proposing an industrialization plan that 
is nature-friendly.  The plan, “A French-Bolivian Project for 
the Well-Being of Bolivians in Harmony with Pachamana 
(Mother Earth),” includes establishing an electric 
manufacturing plant, a prerequisite of the Morales 
administration for investors interested in the Salar de 
Uyumi.
33
 Yet, the Bolivian government has yet to respond to 
Bolloré or any other investor. “We want partners, not 
                                                 
30
 Simon Moores, “Bolivia/Korea Strike Lithium Deal,” Industrial 
Minerals, August 17, 2009; and “French/Bolivia Lithium,” Industrial 
Minerals, 10 July 2009. 
31
 “Iran to Study Bolivia‟s Lithium Reserves,” Press TV, 25 November 
2009. 
32
 Anf-Agencia, “Irán también apoyará el desarrollo de la industria de 
litio en Bolivia,” Los Tiempos.com, November  24, 2010. 
33
 “Francesa Bolloré reitera interés en litio boliviano y pide acelerar 
proyecto,” Bolivia: Lo Mejor que Tenemos, 29 April 2010, 
http://boliviateamo.blogspot.com/2010/04/francesa-bollore-reitera-
interes-en.html.  
17 
patrons,” is President Morales' motto for refusing to accept 
offers from the interested investors.  As such, mining of 
Bolivian lithium reserves will depend for now on the 
capacity of the Morales administration to negotiate and 
balance the benefits of all the stakeholders vs. his own 
political agenda. 
 
INSTITUTIONAL  AND POLITICAL OBSTACLES FOR 
DEVELOPING BOLIVIAN LITHIUM  
 
It remains to be seen if the Morales administration will be 
able to take advantage of growing market demands for 
lithium or the opportunity will be left for future Bolivian 
governments. After two decades of foreign interest in 
Bolivia's reserves, the country's natural resource policies, 
regional posture and poor infrastructure have led foreign 
investment in lithium mining to increasingly favor Chile and 
Argentina in recent years.
34
  Bolivia will have to overcome 
daunting obstacles before it will be able to export significant 
amounts of lithium to international markets.  Key 
developmental challenges are outlined below.   
 
LACKING A ROAD MAP 
 
Bolivia does not have yet the technical capacity to achieve 
the goals laid out by the Morales administration regarding 
exploitation of the country‟s lithium reserves.  President 
Morales alleges that Bolivia itself will produce electric cars. 
There is no clear indication when the electric car will be 
fully developed--since the industrial capacity for this type of 
complex industrial process is inexistent in the country-- how 
big that market will be, and when it will peak. Bolivia could 
aim at more traditional lithium markets, such as glass and 
ceramics, but demand in these markets is not likely to be as 
                                                 
34
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profitable. A middle course would be for Bolivia to supply 
already proven types of lithium batteries for products such as 
watches, cell phones, iPods, laptops and other electronic 
devices. No matter which option is finally selected, Bolivia 
will have to come up with a clear plan or road map to 
maximize the development potential of its lithium reserves. 
It does not yet have one.
35
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES 
 
The chronic institutional deficiencies and lack of stability of 
the Bolivian state pose serious questions regarding its 
capacity to manage an ambitious lithium development 
program. Problems of inadequate administrative capacity 
within the Bolivian government clearly antedate the current 
Morales administration.  To undertake lithium development 
successfully, the Bolivian state will need trained and 
qualified experts in the technical and scientific aspects of 
lithium mining, environmental controls, in business and 
financial management, as well as in international legal 
contracts, social and environmental impact assessments. At 
present, those capacities required for effective, professional 
development of its lithium resources are not in place.
36
  
 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 
 
Serious potential environmental problems stemming from 
lithium mining in Bolivia cannot be ignored.  Bolivia‟s 
ecologically fragile Salar de Uyuni could become an 
environmental disaster, if sufficient precautions are not 
taken. The adequacy of Bolivia‟s environmental strategy for 
lithium development in Southwest Potosí is questioned by 
many Bolivian and international environmental 
organizations. Lithium mining could cause a major water 
crisis in the Uyuni region, which already suffers from serious 
                                                 
35
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water shortages that negatively impact the farming, llama 
herders, the tourism industry, and drinking water supplies. 
While Bolivian officials claim that the national lithium 
project‟s water requirements will be minimal, their estimates 
are based on only limited and incomplete information.
37
 
  
Contamination of the air, water and soil is also a potential 
concern. Large quantities of toxic chemicals must be used to 
process the predicted 30,000 to 40,000 tons of lithium per 
year that the project expects to mine. The escape of such 
chemicals via spills or air emissions could threaten the 
communities in the area and the ecosystem as a whole. 
Reports from Chile‟s Salar de Atacama describe a landscape 
marred by toxic piles of discarded salt and extensive canals 
filled with chemically contaminated water.  
 
Bolivian officials have often minimized such risks in the past 
while the institutional systems in place to protect the 
environment are inadequate at best. Public institutions, such 
as Bolivia‟s Ministry of the Environment and Water, that are 
responsible for enforcing compliance with national 
environmental regulations and standards, do not have the 
professional expertise, technical capabilities or legal 
authority to intervene effectively.
38
  
 
THREATS TO BOLIVIA’S RURAL COMMUNITIES AND 
TOURISM 
 
Some groups and communities in the region openly endorse 
lithium development as an opportunity for increased income 
and development. But there are also groups with serious 
objections that oppose such development. Quinoa producers 
and tourism operators have repeatedly expressed concerns 
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about the benefits that the Bolivian government has 
promised from lithium on the grounds that the supposed 
benefits would not meet local needs. Moreover, lithium 
development could seriously damage two key industries in 
the region – agriculture and tourism. Bolivia‟s laws 
guaranteeing community participation are as weak as its 
environmental protections.
39
 
 
The Salar de Uyuni, often classified as a natural wonder of 
the world, is an area of outstanding natural beauty.  
Flamingos breed in the lagoon created over the Salar during 
the summer rains.  More than 60,000 tourists visit the area 
every year.  The ecosystem as well as the tourist industry in 
the area could be seriously compromised in the search for 
lithium.
40
   
 
BOLIVIA -U.S RELATIONS 
 
US relations with Bolivia under the administration of 
President Morales have been tense and antagonistic. 
President Morales has consistently opposed free-trade 
policies advocated by the United States and adamantly 
refused to negotiate with the U.S.-sponsored regional 
Andean free trade agreement, as did Ecuador and Venezuela.  
 
The US has been concerned about rising Bolivian coca 
cultivation. Bolivia is the world's third largest producer of 
coca leaf, the raw material used to manufacture cocaine. 
Crop-eradication programs in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
funded by the US, incensed many of Bolivia's poorest 
farmers – mainly Morales supporters - for whom coca is 
often their only source of income.  A former coca farmer 
himself, Morales tolerant policies towards coca cultivation 
for traditional and medicinal uses has progressively 
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worsened U.S.-Bolivian bilateral relations since 2006.
41
  The 
close alliance between the Morales administration and 
Venezuela‟s President Hugo Chavez has also made the 
Bolivian government antagonistic to US policies in the 
region.  
 
In 2008, Washington suspended most U.S. drug control 
funding for Bolivia and recalled Ambassador Philip 
Goldberg for “consultations”.  President Morales also took 
actions against the U.S.  He expelled the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) alternative 
development workers from the Chapare coca growing 
region.
42
 He formally expelled Ambassador Goldberg, after 
accusing him of meddling in Bolivia‟s internal affairs. Soon 
after, the US government temporarily suspended Peace 
Corps operations in Bolivia. Washington followed by 
declaring that Bolivia had “failed” to uphold its international 
counterdrug obligations, although President George W. Bush 
did grant Bolivia a “national security waiver” so that U.S. 
assistance would not automatically be cut off.  President 
Bush also suspended Bolivia‟s U.S. trade preferences under 
the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act 
(ATPDEA), again citing Bolivia‟s failure to adhere to anti-
narcotics commitments. In November 2008, Morales ordered 
the U.S Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) out of Bolivia.
43
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 The Obama administration maintained Bolivia‟s suspension 
from APTDEA in 2009 and again in 2010.  In early June 
2010, however, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western 
Hemisphere Affairs, Arturo Valenzuela, traveled to La Paz 
to re-start talks on a bilateral framework agreement that 
could lead to the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations 
between the two countries within the year.
44
 
 
BOLIVIA’S  LITHIUM  GAMBLE  
 
The strains in U.S.-Bolivian bilateral relations have not 
dampened efforts by non-U.S. foreign corporations to court 
the Bolivian government. U.S. companies, however, do seem 
to have been disadvantaged by the recurrent tensions in 
bilateral relations. But even non-U.S.-based foreign 
companies seeking to tap Bolivia‟s lithium reserves have had 
to navigate carefully around Morales‟ resource nationalism. 
Indeed, President Morales has clashed repeatedly with 
American, European and even South American investors. In 
2006 Morales shocked Brazil by nationalizing Petrobras‟ 
(Brazil‟s state-owned petroleum company) natural gas 
projects in Bolivia and then demanding a sharp rise in the 
prices paid by the Brazilians for Bolivia‟s natural gas. He 
carried out further nationalizations just before the 2009 vote 
on the Constitution by sending Bolivian soldiers to occupy 
the operations of the British oil giant BP.
45
 
 
Bolivia will have to invest heavily over the next few years in 
order to produce lithium carbonate for export. With world 
economic growth slowed as a result of the 2008-09 global 
recession, it remains unclear how Bolivia will be able to 
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make such investments on its own.
46
 Given domestic realities 
and international circumstances, it is virtually inevitable that 
Bolivia will have to seek partnerships with foreign 
companies in 2010 and beyond to obtain badly needed 
capital and technology. Bolivia‟s current tensions with 
Washington have effectively left American companies on the 
sidelines as other foreign enterprises continue to actively 
negotiate lithium deals in Bolivia.
47
  
 
Yet, largely because of internal political tensions and 
nationalism, Bolivia continued in 2010 to vacillate regarding 
how best to tap its lithium. This hesitation has permitted 
nations with smaller reserves to step up to meet growing 
world demand for lithium. Chile leads the pack. China has 
also emerged as a top lithium producer, tapping reserves 
found in a Tibetan salt flat. But geologists and economists 
are unsure whether world lithium reserves outside of Bolivia 
are enough to meet exploding global demand, although some 
are convinced that accessible lithium resources are 
significantly larger than estimated by the United States 
Geological Survey.  If true, Bolivia‟s current window of 
opportunity to exploit its lithium riches in the national 
interest under advantageous international conditions would 
appear to be only a limited one that could eventually be 
eclipsed by lithium finds in other world regions or by the 
emergence of new, alternative technological breakthroughs 
that do not rely on lithium at all.  
 
 
 
                                                 
46
 Susan Kaufman Purcell, “Why Greece is Important to Latin America,” 
AméricaEconomía, June 2010. 
47
 Romero, “In Bolivia, Untapped Bounty Meets Nationalism;” on 
business conditions in Bolivia, see The World Bank, Doing Business in 
Bolivia, Washington DC: The Word Bank, 2010. 
http://espanol.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/DealingLicenses/. 
 
24 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
Bolivian lithium does not appear critical in satisfying US 
demand.  Nor is it clear if Bolivia‟s real reserves could 
produce as much lithium as the reserve base indicates or of 
desirable quality.  Moreover, lithium-carbonate batteries 
might not provide the environmentally sound and sustainable 
alternative the US seeks to reduce its demand on fossil oil.  
Yet, considering the unpredictability of the technological 
developments, having access to potential resources is 
generally a sound policy.    
 
The perspectives for the Morales administration capacity to 
develop its lithium potential, under current conditions, are 
not encouraging.   Bolivia lacks the technical and managerial 
capacity to do so on its own.  Also, most experts believe that 
Bolivia‟s lithium potential does not match that of its oil and 
gas reserves.  The Morales administration‟s reluctance to 
accept the offers being presented by foreign investors may 
result in Bolivia losing an opportunity to profit from the 
growing demand for lithium.   Also, investors with the 
needed know-how may be reluctant to investing under an 
environment charged by recent nationalizations and lack of 
assurance of negotiating in a leveled field and under 
sustainable conditions.   Yet, countries like Iran may be 
approaching Bolivia hoping to have access to its resources 
both for industrial or nuclear purposes and thus, the lithium 
may become increasingly politicized.    
 
The progressive worsening of US-Bolivian relationship in 
recent years, characterized by mutual suspicion and distrust, 
presents formidable obstacles to any rapid improvements. 
Yet, the Obama administration has indicated a willingness to 
strengthen relations with Bolivia.   Considering that natural 
resources often last longer than governments, despite current 
antagonistic relationship, US would be well-served to have a 
25 
long term policy strategy in dealing with Bolivia and its 
resources.  
 
Finally, the United States and the international community 
should raise awareness of the environmental risks involved 
in tapping lithium and other resources in the unique Salar de 
Uyuni.  
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APPENDIX 
Bolivia under the Morales Government 
 
A nation of statistical extremes, landlocked Bolivia is the 
highest and most isolated South American country.  
Approximately 60 percent of its 9.9 million (2009) 
inhabitants are indigenous, the largest proportion of any 
country in the hemisphere.  Although rich in mineral and 
energy resources, Bolivia ranks among South America's 
poorest countries. Wealthy urban elites, mostly of Spanish 
ancestry, traditionally dominated economic, social and 
political life of the country while the great majority of 
Bolivians, mostly low-income subsistence indigenous 
peasant farmers, miners, small traders and artisans, had little 
or no voice in national affairs.
48
 
 
Victorious in the presidential campaign of 2005, Evo 
Morales is the first full-blooded, Indian president ever 
elected in Bolivia.  Morales belongs to an Aymara 
impoverished family.  He rose to prominence in Bolivian 
politics in the 1990s as a champion of the marginalized rural 
and urban poor, first as the leader of Bolivia's militant coca 
farmers‟ (cocaleros) association and, subsequently, of the 
leftist Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) party.  The 
movements he led were increasingly imbued with 
nationalism and heightened ethnic awareness.  
 
In May 2006, President Morales put Bolivia‟s energy 
industry under state control. Foreign energy firms were given 
six months to sell at least 51 percent of their holdings to the 
state and negotiate new contracts or leave the country.  
                                                 
48
 BBC, “Country Profile: Bolivia,” BBC News, December 19, 2009, 
14:39:39 GMT, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-
/2/hi/americas/country_profiles/1210487.stm. 
Library of Congress, A Country Study, Bolivia, Washington DC, 
American University, 1991. 
27 
Although vehemently opposed by Bolivian business elites 
and foreign oil executives as a radical move, Morales 
nationalization was in practice more a renegotiation of terms 
with the foreign energy companies than an outright 
expropriation. As world energy prices rose in 2006 and 
beyond, the country's finances improved dramatically. At the 
same time, President Morales allied his government closely 
with the leftist, populist and anti-American Venezuelan 
President, Hugo Chavez, and adopted an increasingly 
critical, public stance toward the United States. 
49
 
  
In June 2006, Morales‟ MAS party won a decisive majority 
in special elections for a new constituent assembly that was 
tasked with rewriting the nation‟s constitution. The resulting 
draft constitution promised more rights to Bolivia's 
indigenous majority and more autonomy to the departments. 
It also contained provisions authorizing an incumbent 
president to stand for re-election for a second five-year term. 
Violent demonstrations by opponents, mainly from the 
wealthy elites, ensued and four of the country's richest 
regions defiantly declared autonomy in protest. The new 
charter was finally approved by more than 60 percent of 
Bolivian voters in a referendum held in January 2009. The 
passage of the new Constitution shifted political power 
toward the highland provinces, where poor, indigenous 
voters predominate, and away from the lowlands, where 
most of Bolivia's food is grown and where its petroleum and 
natural gas reserves are located.
50
 
 
Talks between Morales‟s congressional backers and the 
fragmented opposition ultimately produced a compromise 
that modified earlier versions of the proposed new charter. 
One of the most polemical articles in the final draft reversed 
a plan to allow Morales to run for re-election indefinitely, 
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limiting him (and future Bolivian presidents) instead to a 
single five-year term without the possibility of re-election. 
Other, often vaguely worded items among the new 
Constitution‟s 411 articles broadened definitions of property 
to include communal ownership; allowed Indians to mete out 
corporal punishment under their own legal systems; extended 
limited autonomy to regional prefects (governors); and 
reaffirmed state control over Bolivia‟s ample natural gas 
reserves and other resources.
51
  
 
Opposition leaders, especially in the eastern lowlands, 
campaigned vigorously against approval of the proposed new 
charter. The Constitution was finally adopted in a 
referendum on January 25, 2009, with close to 60% of the 
country in favor. The four departments in Bolivia‟s 
rebellious eastern lowlands rejected the charter by wide 
margins. Despite the intensity of his opposition in the eastern 
lowlands, President Morales scored a comfortable win over 
his conservative opponents when he stood for re-election in 
December 2009, improving on his 2005 majority and 
becoming the first incumbent Bolivian president since 1964 
to win a second term. His party also won control of both 
chambers of congress, though in the lower house it fell just 
short of the two-thirds majority needed for constitutional 
changes.
52
  
 
On April 4, 2010, Bolivians went to the polls to elect 500 
officials in local and provincial elections, including the 
governors of nine departments. The election was seen as a 
crucial test of the spreading strength and influence of 
President Morales and his MAS party. They won handily. On 
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May 1, 2010, the Morales government took control of four 
privately owned companies that generate electricity. The 
companies accounted for more than half of Bolivia‟s 
electricity market.
53
  
 
The key to Morales's success has been his appeal to the 65 
percent of Bolivians who identify as indigenous and who see 
him as "one of their own". Under Morales, they have 
benefited from increased levels social spending, boosted by 
high international prices for hydrocarbons and more taxes on 
foreign oil and gas companies. Cash payments have been 
made to poor families to encourage school attendance. Extra 
pension payments have been provided to the elderly and pre-
natal and post-natal care has been extended to mothers 
without access to health care. Some estimates suggest that 
the payments reached a quarter of Bolivia's almost 10 million 
people in 2010.
54
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